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Services with Multiple Content Providers:
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Jeong-woo Cho and Yung Yi, Members, IEEE
Abstract—This paper studies an incentive structure for co-
operation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there
exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic
approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure
consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where
peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content
distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to
players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized
formula for individual payoffs when a “Shapley-like” payoff
mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is
unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave,
which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a
single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also
show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there
always exist coalition structures which are not convergent to
the grand coalition under a dynamic among coalition structures.
Our results give us an incontestable fact that a provider does not
tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services,
and be separated from them. Three facets of the noncooperative
(selfish) providers are illustrated; (i) underpaid peers, (ii) service
monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Lastly, we
propose a stable payoff mechanism which improves fairness of
profit-sharing by regulating the selfishness of the players as
well as grants the content providers a limited right of realistic
bargaining. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic
and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between
fairness and individual providers’ competition in peer-assisted
services.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The Internet is becoming more content-oriented, and the
need of cost-effective and scalable distribution of contents has
become the central role of the Internet. Uncoordinated peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems, e.g., BitTorrent, have been successful
in distributing contents, but the rights of the content owners
are not protected well, and most of the P2P contents are in
fact illegal. In its response, a new type of service, called
peer-assisted service, has received significant attention these
days. In peer-assisted services, users commit a part of their
resources to assist content providers in content distribution
with objective of enjoying both scalability/efficiency in P2P
systems and controllability in client-server systems. Examples
of application of peer-assisted services include nano data
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Fig. 1. Two coalition structures for a dual-provider peer-assisted service.
center [1] and IPTV [2], where high potential of operational
cost reduction was observed. For instance, there are now 1.8
million IPTV subscribers in South Korea, and the financial
sectors forecast that by 2014 the IPTV subscribers is expected
to be 106 million [3]. However, it is clear that most users will
not just “donate” their resources to content providers. Thus,
the key factor to the success of peer-assisted services is how
to (economically) incentivize users to commit their valuable
resources and participate in the service.
One of nice mathematical tools to study incentive-
compatibility of peer-assisted services is the coalition game
theory which covers how payoffs should be distributed and
whether such a payoff scheme can be executed by rational
individuals or not. In peer-assisted services, the “symbiosis”
between providers and peers are sustained when (i) the offered
payoff scheme guarantees fair assessment of players’ contri-
bution under a provider-peer coalition and (ii) each individual
has no incentive to exit from the coalition. In the coalition
game theory, the notions of Shapley value and the core have
been popularly applied to address (i) and (ii), respectively,
when the entire players cooperate, referred to as the grand
coalition. A recent paper by Misra et al. [4] demonstrates that
the Shapley value approach is a promising payoff mechanism
to provide right incentives for cooperation in a single-provider
peer-assisted service.
However, in practice, the Internet consists of multiple con-
tent providers, even if only giant providers are counted. In
the multi-provider setting, users and providers are coupled
in a more complex manner, thus the model becomes much
more challenging and even the cooperative game theoretic
framework itself is unclear, e.g., definition of the worth of a
coalition. Also, the results and their implications in the multi-
provider setting may experience drastic changes, compared to
the single-provider case.
The grand coalition is expected to be the “best” coalition
2in the peer-assisted service with multiple providers in that it
provides the highest aggregate payoff. To illustrate, see an
example in Fig. 1 with two providers (Google TV and iTunes)
and a large number of peers. Consider two cooperation types:
(i) separated, where there exists a fixed partition of peers for
each provider, and (ii) coalescent, where each peer is possible
to assist any provider. In the separated case, a candidate payoff
scheme is based on the Shapley value in each disconnected
coalition. In the coalescent case, the Shapley value is also a
candidate payoff scheme after a worth function of the grand
coalition is defined, where a reasonable worth function1 can
be the total optimal profit, maximized over all combinations of
peer partitions to each provider. Consequently, the total payoff
for the coalescent case exceeds that for the separated case,
unless the two partitions of both cases are equivalent. Shapley
value is defined by a few agreeable axioms, one of which
is efficiency2, meaning that the every cent of coalition worth
is distributed to players. Since smaller worth is shared out
among players in the separated case, at least one individual
is underpaid as compared with the coalescent case. Thus,
providers and users are recommended to form the grand
coalition and be paid off based on the Shapley values.
However, it is still questionable whether peers are willing to
stay in the grand coalition and thus the consequent Shapley-
value based payoff mechanism is desirable in the multi-
provider setting. In this paper, we anatomize incentive struc-
tures in peer-assisted services with multiple content providers
and focus on stability issues from two different angles: stability
at equilibrium of Shapley value and convergence to the equi-
librium. We show that the Shapley payoff scheme may lead
to unstable coalition structure, and propose a different notion
of payoff distribution scheme, χ value, under which peers and
providers stay in the stable coalition as well as better fairness
is guaranteed.
B. Related Work
The research on incentive structure in the P2P systems
(e.g., BitTorrent) has been studied extensively. To incapacitate
free-riders in P2P systems, who only download contents but
upload nothing, from behaving selfishly, a number of incentive
mechanisms suitable for distribution of copy-free contents
have been proposed (See [5] and references therein), using
game theoretic approaches. Alternative approaches to exploit
the potential of the P2P systems for reducing the distribution
(or operational) costs of the copyrighted contents have been
recently adopted by [1], [4]. To the best of our knowledge, the
work by Misra et al. [4] is the first to study the profit-sharing
mechanism (payoff mechanism) of peer-assisted services.
Coalition game theory has been applied to model diverse
networking behaviors, where the main focus in most cases
(e.g., [4]) was to study the stability of a specific equilibrium
i.e., the grand coalition in connection with the notion of
core. Recently, Saad et al. [6], [7], discussed the stability
and dynamics of endogenous formation of general coalition
structures. In particular, [7] introduced a coalition game model
1In Section III-A, we establish that this definition is derived directly from
an essential property of coalition.
2To be discussed formally in Section II-C
for self-organizing agents (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles) col-
lecting data from arbitrarily located tasks in wireless networks
and proved the stability of the proposed algorithm by using
hedonic preference (and dominance). In this paper, we use the
stability notion by Hart and Kurz [8] (see also [9]) to study
the dynamics of coalition structures in peer-assisted services.
The stability notion in [8] is based on the preferences of any
arbitrary coalition while the hedonic coalition games are based
on the preferences of individuals. Other subtle differences are
described in [10].
C. Main Contributions and Organization
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1) Following the preliminaries in Section II, in Section III, we
describe and propose the cooperative game theoretic frame-
work of the peer-assisted service with multiple providers.
After defining a worth function that is provably the unique
feasible worth function satisfying two essential properties,
i.e., feasibility and superadditivity of a coalition game,
we provide a closed-form formula of the Shapley value
for a general coalition with multiple providers and peers,
where we take a fluid-limit approximation for mathematical
tractability. This is a non-trivial generalization of the Shap-
ley value for the single-provider case in [4]. In fact, our
formula in Theorem 1 establishes the general Shapley value
for distinguished multiple atomic players and infinitesimal
players in the context of the Aumann-Shapley (A-S) prices
[11] in coalition game theory.
2) In Section IV, we discuss in various ways that the Shapley
payoff regime cannot incentivize rational players to form
the grand coalition, implying that fair profit-sharing and
opportunism of players cannot stand together. First, we
prove that the Shapley value for the multiple-provider
case is not in the core under mild conditions, e.g., each
provider’s cost function is concave. This is in stark con-
trast to the single-provider case where the concave cost
function stabilizes the equilibrium. Second, we study the
dynamic formation of coalitions in peer-assisted services by
introducing the notion of stability defined by the seminal
work of Hart and Kurz [8]. Finally, we show that, if we
adopt a Shapley-like payoff mechanism, called Aumann-
Dre`ze value, irrespective of stability of the grand coalition,
there always exist initial states which do not converge to
the grand coalition.
3) In Section V, we present three examples stating the prob-
lems of the non-cooperative peer-assisted service: (i) the
peers are underpaid compared to their Shapley payoffs, (ii)
a provider paying the highest dividend to peers monopo-
lizes all peers, and (iii) Shapley value for each coalition
gives rise to an oscillatory behavior of coalition structures.
These examples suggest that the system with the separated
providers may be even unstable as well as unfair in a peer-
assisted service market.
4) In Section VI, as a partial solution to the problems of
Shapley-like payoffs (i.e., Shapley and Aumann-Dre`ze),
we propose an alternative payoff scheme, called χ value
[12]. This payoff mechanism is relatively fair in the sense
that players, at the least, apportion the difference between
3the coalition worth and the sum of their fair shares, i.e.,
Shapley payoffs, and stabilizes the whole system. It is also
practical in the sense that providers are granted a limited
right of bargaining. That is, a provider may award an
extra bonus to peers by cutting her dividend, competing
with other providers in a fair way. More importantly, we
show that authorities can effectively avoid unjust rivalries
between providers by implementing a simplistic measure.
After presenting a practical example of peer-assisted ser-
vices with multiple providers in delay-tolerant networks in
Section VII, we conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Since this paper investigates a multi-provider case, where a
peer can choose any provider to assist, we start this section by
defining a coalition game with a peer partition (i.e., a coalition
structure) and introducing the payoff mechanism thereof.
A. Game with Coalition Structure
A game with coalition structure is a triple (N, v,P) where
N is a player set and v : 2N → R (2N is the set of
all subsets of N ) is a worth function, v(∅) = 0. v(K)
is called the worth of a coalition K ⊆ N . P is called a
coalition structure for (N, v); it is a partition of N where
C(i) ∈ P denotes the coalition containing player i. For your
reference, a coalition structure P can be regarded as a set
of disjoint coalitions. The grand coalition is the partition
P = {N}. For instance3, a partition of N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
is P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}}, C(4) = {3, 4, 5}, and the grand
coalition is P = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. P(S) is the set of all
partitions of S ⊆ N . For notational simplicity, a game without
coalition structure (N, v, {N}) is denoted by (N, v). A value
of player i is an operator φi(N, v,P) that assigns a payoff to
player i. We define φK =
∑
i∈K φi for all K ⊆ N .
To conduct the equilibrium analysis of coalition games, the
notion of core has been extensively used to study the stability
of grand coalition P = {N}:
Definition 1 (Core). The core of a game (N, v) is defined by:{
φ(N, v) |
∑
i∈N
φi(N, v) = v(N)
and
∑
i∈K
φi(N, v) ≥ v(K), ∀K ⊆ N
}
.
If a payoff vector φ(N, v) lies in the core, no player in N has
an incentive to split off to form another coalition K because
the worth of the coalition K , v(K), is no more than the
payoff sum
∑
i∈K φi(N, v). Note that the definition of the
core hypothesizes that the grand coalition is already formed
ex-ante. We can see the core as an analog of Nash equilibrium
from noncooperative games. Precisely speaking, it should be
viewed as an analog of strong Nash equilibrium where no
arbitrary coalition of players can create worth which is larger
than what they receive in the grand coalition. If a payoff vector
φ(N, v) lies in the core, then the grand coalition is stable with
respect to any collusion to break the grand coalition.
3A player i is an element of a coalition C = C(i), which is in turn an
element of a partition P . P is an element of P(N) while a subset of 2N .
B. Shapley Value and Aumann-Dre`ze Value
On the premise that the player set is not partitioned, i.e.,
P = {N}, the Shapley value, denoted by ϕ (not φ), is
popularly used as a fair distribution of the grand coalition’s
worth to individual players, defined by:
ϕi(N, v)=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N |−|S|−1)!
|N |! (v(S ∪ {i})−v(S)) . (1)
Shapley [13] gives the following interpretation: “(i) Starting
with a single member, the coalition adds one player at a time
until everybody has been admitted. (ii) The order in which
players are to join is determined by chance, with all arrange-
ments equally probable. (iii) Each player, on his admission,
demands and is promised the amount which his adherence
contributes to the value of the coalition.” The Shapley value
quantifies the above that is axiomatized (see Section II-C) and
has been treated as a worth distribution scheme. The beauty
of the Shapley value lies in that the payoff “summarizes” in
one number all the possibilities of each player’s contribution
in every coalition structure.
Given a coalition structure P 6= {N}, one can obtain
the Aumann-Dre`ze value (A-D value) [14] of player i, also
denoted by ϕ, by taking C(i), which is the coalition containing
player i, to be the player set and by computing the Shapley
value of player i of the reduced game (C(i), v). It is easy to
see that the A-D value can be construed as a direct extension of
the Shapley value to a game with coalition structure. Note that
both Shapley value and A-D value are denoted by ϕ because
the only difference is the underlying coalition structure P .
C. Axiomatic Characterizations of Values
We provide here an axiomatic characterization of the Shap-
ley value [13].
Axiom 1 (Coalition Efficiency, CE). ∑j∈C φj(N, v,P) =
v(C), ∀C ∈ P .
Axiom 2 (Coalition Restricted Symmetry, CS). If
j ∈ C(i) and v(K∪{i}) = v(K∪{j}) for all K ⊆ N \{i, j},
then φi(N, v,P) = φj(N, v,P).
Axiom 3 (Additivity, ADD). For all coalition functions v, v′
and i ∈ N , φi(N, v + v′,P) = φi(N, v,P) + φi(N, v′,P).
Axiom 4 (Null Player, NP). If v(K ∪ {i}) = v(K) for all
K ⊆ N , then φi(N, v,P) = 0.
Recall that the basic premise of the Shapley value is that the
player set is not partitioned, i.e., P = {N}. It is well-known
[12], [13] that the Shapley value, defined in (1), is uniquely
characterized by CE, CS, ADD and NP for P = {N}. The
A-D value is also uniquely characterized by CE, CS, ADD
and NP (Axioms 1-4), but in this case for arbitrary coalition
structure P [14]. In the literature, e.g., [6], [15], the A-D value
has been used to analyze the static games where a coalition
structure is exogenously given.
Definition 2 (Coalition Independent, CI). If i ∈ C ⊆ N ,
C ∈ P and C ∈ P ′, then φi(N, v,P) = φi(N, v,P ′).
From the definition of the A-D value, the payoff of player
i in coalition C(i) is affected neither by the player set N nor
by coalitions C ∈ P , C 6= C(i). Note that only C(i) contains
the player i. Thus, it is easy to prove that the A-D value is
4Fig. 2. If a payoff vector lies in the core, the grand coalition is stable [8].
coalition independent. From CI of the A-D value, in order to
decide the payoffs of a game with general coalition structure
P , it suffices to decide the payoffs of players within each
coalition, say C ∈ P , without considering other coalitions
C ∈ P , C 6= C(i). In other words, once we decide the payoffs
of a coalition C ∈ P , the payoffs remain unchanged even
though other coalitions, C′ ∈ P , C′ 6= C, vary. Thus, for any
given coalition structure P , any coalition C ∈ P is just two-
fold in terms of the number of providers in C: (i) one provider
or (ii) two or more providers, as depicted in Fig. 1.
Yet another reason why CI attracts our attention is that it
enables us to define the stability of a game with coalition
structure in the following simplistic way:
Definition 3 (Stable Coalition Structure [8]). We say that a
coalition structure P ′ blocks P , where P ′, P ∈ P(N), with
respect to φ if and only if there exists some C ∈ P ′ such that
φi(N, v, {C, · · · }) > φi(N, v,P) for all i ∈ C. In this case,
we also say that C blocks P . If there does not exist any P ′
which blocks P , P is called stable.
Due to CI of the A-D value, all stability notions defined by
the seminal work of Hart and Kurz [8] coincide with the above
simplistic definition, as discussed by Tutic [9]. Definition 3
can be intuitively interpreted that, if there exists any subset of
players C who improve their payoffs away from the current
coalition structure, they will form a new coalition C. In other
words, if a coalition structure P has any blocking coalition C,
some rational players will break P to increase their payoffs.
The basic premise here is that players are not clairvoyant, i.e.,
they are interested only in improving their instant payoffs in
a myopic way. If a payoff vector lies in the core, the grand
coalition is stable in the sense of Definition 3, but the converse
is not necessarily true (see Fig. 2).
D. Comparison with Other Values
In a particular category of games, called voting games or
simple games, Banzhaf value as well as the Shapley value
(also known as Shapley-Shubik index in this context) has been
used in the literature (See, e.g., [16] and references therein).
While the Shapley value has been extensively studied in many
papers, there are no similar results for the Banzhaf value. For
instance, the Shapley value is proven to lie in the core for
a special type of games, called convex games, whereas there
is no equivalent result for the Banzhaf value. Moreover, the
Banzhaf value violates the efficiency axiom CE in Section
II-C for a certain coalition structure P = {N}, leading to
inefficient sharing of the grand coalition worth.
As compared with Aumann-Dre`ze value, a new value,
referred to as Owen value (See, e.g., [15, Chapter 8.8] or [17,
Chapter XII]) has emerged based on an alternative viewpoint
on coalition, where a coalition forms not to share the coalition
worth, but only to maximize their bargaining power with
regard to division of the worth of the grand coalition. In other
words, players form a labor union (coalition) to obtain a better
bargaining position leading to a larger payoff, implying that
the coalition efficiency axiom CE is also violated. A delicate
premise of this approach is that players must form the grand
coalition, the worth of which is in fact the largest worth in
superadditive games (See Definition 5), and bargain with each
other at the same time. Also, in the context of P2P systems,
whether it is more reasonable to nullify CE so that a portion of
a worth of a coalition (peers and providers) C ∈ P becomes
transferrable to other coalitions C′ ∈ P , C 6= C′, remains an
open economic question.
III. COALITION GAME IN PEER-ASSISTED SERVICES
In this section, we first define a coalition game in a peer-
assisted service with multiple content providers by classifying
the types of coalition structures as separated, where a coalition
includes only one provider, and coalescent, where a coalition
is allowed to include more than one providers (see Fig. 1). To
define the coalition game, we will define a worth function of
an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N for such two cases.
A. Worth Function in Peer-Assisted Services
Assume that players N are divided into two sets, the set
of content providers Z := {p1, · · · , pζ}, and the set of peers
H := {n1, · · · , nη}, i.e., N = Z∪H . We also assume that the
peers are homogeneous, e.g., the same computing powers, disk
cache sizes, and upload bandwidths. Later, we discuss that our
results can be readily extended to nonhomogeneous peers. The
set of peers assisting providers is denoted by H¯ ⊆ H where
x := |H¯ |/η, i.e., the fraction of assisting peers. We define the
worth of a coalition S to be the amount of cost reduction due
to cooperative distribution of the contents by the players in S
in both separated and coalescent cases.
Separated case: Denote by Ωηp(x(S)) the operational cost of a
provider p when the coalition S consists of a single provider p
and x(S) · η assisting peers. Since the operational cost cannot
be negative and may decrease with the number of assisting
peers, we assume the following to simplify the exposition:
• Assumption: Ωηp(x) is non-increasing in x for all p ∈ Z .
Note that from the homogeneity assumption of peers, the cost
function depends only on the fraction of assisting peers. Then,
we define the worth function vˆ(S) for a coalition S having a
single provider as:
vˆ(S) := Ωηp(0)− Ω
η
p(x(S)) (2)
where Ωηp(0) corresponds to the cost when there are no
assisting peers. For a coalition S with no provider, we simply
have vˆ(S) := 0. For notational simplicity, x(S) is henceforth
denoted by x, unless confusion arises.
Coalescent case: In contrast to the separated case, where a
coalition includes a single provider, the worth for the coa-
lescent case is not clear yet, since depending on which peers
assist which providers the amount of cost reduction may differ.
One of reasonable definitions would be the maximum worth
5out of all peer partitions, i.e., the worth for the coalescent case
is defined by: for a coalition with at least two providers,
v(S) :=max
{∑
C∈P
vˆ(C)
∣∣∣P∈P(S) s.t. |Z∩C|=1, ∀C∈P} ,
(3)
and v(S) := vˆ(S) for a coalition S with at most one
provider. The definition above implies that we view a coalition
containing more than one provider as the most productive
coalition whose worth is maximized by choosing the optimal
partition P∗ among all possible partitions of S. Note that (3)
is consistent with the definition (2) for |Z ∩ S| = 1, i.e.,
v(S) = vˆ(S) for |Z ∩ S| = 1.
Five remarks are in order. First, as opposed to [4] where
vˆ({p}) = ηR − Ωηp(0) (R is the subscription fee paid by
any peer), we simply assume that vˆ({p}) = 0. Note that, as
discussed in [15, Chapter 2.2.1], it is no loss of generality
to assume that, initially, each provider has earned no money.
In our context, this means that it does not matter how much
fraction of peers is subscribing to each provider because each
peer has already paid the subscription fee to providers ex-ante.
Second, Ωηp(x) may not be decreasing because, for example,
electricity expense of the computers and the maintenance cost
of the hard disks of peers may exceed the cost reduction due
to peers’ assistance in content distribution, e.g., Annualized
Failure Rate (AFR) of hard disk drives is over 8.6% for three-
year old ones [18].
Third, the worth function in peer-assisted services can re-
flect the diversity of peers. It is not difficult to extend our result
to the case where peers belong to distinct classes. For example,
peers may be distinguished by different upload bandwidths and
different hard disk cache sizes. A point at issue for the multiple
provider case is whether peers who are not subscribing to the
content of a provider may be allowed to assist the provider
or not. On the assumption that the content is ciphered and
not decipherable by the peers who do not know its password
which is given only to the subscribers, providers will allow
those peers to assist the content distribution. Otherwise, we
can easily reflect this issue by dividing the peers into a number
of classes where each class is a set of peers subscribing to a
certain content.
Fourth, it should be clearly understood that our worth func-
tion (3) does not encompass more than just the peer-partition
optimization. That is, we speculate that cooperation among
providers might lead to further expenses cut by optimizing
their network resources. We recognize the lack of this ‘added
bonus’ to be the major weakness in our model.
Lastly, it should be noted that the worth function in (3)
is selected in order to satisfy two properties. First of all, it
follows from the definition of v in (3) that no other coalition
function v′(·) can be greater than v(·), i.e., v(·) ≥ v′(·)
because v is the total cost reduction that is maximized over
all possible peer partitions to each provider.
Definition 4 (Feasibility). For all worth function v′(·), we
have v(S) ≥ v′(S) for all S ⊆ N .
The second property, superadditivity, is one of the most
elementary properties, which ensures that the core is nonempty
by appealing to Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [15, Theorem
3.1.4].
Definition 5 (Superadditivity). A worth v is superadditive if
(S, T ⊆ N and S ∩ T = ∅)⇒ v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
The following lemma holds by the fact that a feasible worth
function cannot be greater than (3), i.e., the largest worth.
Lemma 1. When the worth for the separated case is given
by (2), for the coalescent case, there exists a unique worth
function that is both superadditive and feasible, given by (3).
Proof: Suppose we have a superadditive worth v′. Firstly,
it follows directly from the assumption (the worth function
for the separate case is (2)) that v′(S) = vˆ(S) if S includes
one provider. (i) Feasibility: It follows from the definition
of feasibility that we have v(·) ≥ v′(·) because v(S) is
the maximum over all possible partitions P ∈ P(S). (ii)
Superadditivity: In the meantime, since v′ is superadditive,
it must satisfy v′(S ∪ T ) ≥ v′(S) + v′(T ) for all disjoint S,
T ⊆ N . This in turn implies v′(S) ≥
∑
C∈P v
′(C) for all
P such that P ∈ P(S). The right-hand side
∑
C∈P v
′(C)
should coincide with v(S) for some P = P∗ such that
|Z ∩ C| = 1 for all C ∈ P∗ (See (3)), where P∗ is the
peer partition which maximizes v(S). Therefore, we have
v′(S) ≥ v(S). Combining this with v(·) ≥ v′(·) uniquely
determines v′(·) = v(·).
In light of this lemma, we can restate that our objective
in this paper is to analyze the incentive structure of peer-
assisted services when the worth of coalition is feasible and
superadditive. This objective in turn implies the form of worth
function in (3).
B. Fluid Aumann-Dre`ze Value for Multi-Provider Coalitions
So far we have defined the worth of coalitions. Now let
us distribute the worth to the players for a given coalition
structure P . Recall that the payoffs of players in a coalition
are independent from other coalitions by the definition of A-
D payoff. Pick a coalition C without loss of generality, and
denote the set of providers in C by Z¯ ⊆ Z . With slight
notational abuse, the set of peers assisting Z¯ is denoted by
H¯ . Once we find the A-D payoff for a coalition consisting of
arbitrary provider set Z¯ ⊆ Z and assisting peer set H¯ ⊆ H , the
payoffs for the separated and coalescent cases in Fig. 1 follow
from the substitutions Z¯ = Z and Z¯ = {p}, respectively. In
light of our discussion in Section II-B, it is more reasonable
to call a Shapley-like payoff mechanism ‘A-D payoff’ and
‘Shapley payoff’ respectively for the partitioned and non-
partitioned games (N, v, {Z¯∪H¯, · · · }) and (N, v, {Z∪H})4.
Fluid Limit: We adopt the limit axioms for a large population
of users to overcome the computational hardness of the A-D
payoffs:
limη→∞ Ω˜
η
p(·) = Ω˜p(·) where Ω˜ηp(·) = 1ηΩ
η
p(·) (4)
which is the asymptotic operational cost per peer in the
system with a large number of peers. We drop superscript
η from notations to denote their limits as η → ∞. From the
4On the contrary, the term ‘Shapley payoff’ was used in [4] to refer to the
payoff for the game (N, v, {Z¯ ∪ H¯, · · · }) where a proper subset of the peer
set assists the content distribution.
6 ϕ˜Z¯p (x) = Ω˜p(0)−
∑
S⊆Z¯\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1 − u)|Z¯|−1−|S|
(
M
S∪{p}
Ω (ux)−M
S
Ω(ux)
)
du, for p ∈ Z¯
ϕ˜Z¯n (x) = −
∑
S⊆Z¯
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)|Z¯|−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (ux)du, for n ∈ H¯.
(FluidAD1)
{
ϕ˜
{p,q}
p (x) = Ω˜p(0)−
∫ 1
0
uM
{p,q}
Ω (ux)du −
∫ 1
0
(1− u)M
{p}
Ω (ux)du +
∫ 1
0
uM
{q}
Ω (ux)du, (p, q are interchangeable)
ϕ˜
{p,q}
n (x) = −
∫ 1
0 u
2 dM
{p,q}
Ω
dx (ux)du −
∑
i∈{p,q}
∫ 1
0 u(1− u)
dM
{i}
Ω
dx (ux)du, for n ∈ H¯. (FluidAD2)
Fig. 3. Fluid Aumann-Dre`ze payoff formula for multi-provider coalitions, construed as an extension of Aumann-Shapley prices to multiple atomic players.
assumption Ωηp(x) > 0, we have Ω˜p(x) ≥ 0. To avoid trivial
cases, we also assume Ω˜p(x) is not constant in the interval
x ∈ [0, 1] for any p ∈ Z . We also introduce the payoff of each
provider per user, defined as ϕ˜ηp := 1ηϕ
η
p . We now derive the
fluid limit equations of the payoffs, shown in Fig. 3, which can
be obtained as η → ∞. The proof of the following theorem
is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 (A-D Payoff for Multiple Providers). As η →
∞, the A-D payoffs of providers and peers under an arbitrary
coalition C = Z¯ ∪ H¯ converge to (FluidAD1) in Fig. 3 where
MSΩ(x) := min
{∑
i∈S Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S yi ≤ x, yi ≥ 0
}
and
M∅Ω(x) := 0. Note that M
{p}
Ω (x) = Ω˜p(x).
The following corollaries are immediate as special cases of
Theorem 1, which we will use in Section V.
Corollary 1 (A-D Payoff for Single Provider). As η → ∞,
the A-D payoffs of providers and peers who belong to a single-
provider coalition, i.e., Z¯ = {p}, converge to:{
ϕ˜
{p}
p (x) = Ω˜p(0)−
∫ 1
0 M
{p}
Ω (ux)du,
ϕ˜
{p}
n (x) = −
∫ 1
0
u
dM
{p}
Ω
dx (ux)du, for n ∈ H¯.
(5)
Corollary 2 (A-D Payoff for Dual Providers). As η → ∞,
the A-D payoffs of providers and peers who belong to a dual-
provider coalition, i.e., Z¯ = {p, q}, converge to (FluidAD2).
Note that our A-D payoff formula in Theorem 1 generalizes
the formula in Misra et al. [4, Theorem 4.3] (i.e., |Z| = 1).
It also establishes the A-D values for distinguished multiple
atomic players (the providers) and infinitesimal players (the
peers), in the context of the Aumann-Shapley (A-S) prices
[11] in coalition game theory.
Our formula for the peers is interpreted as follows: Take the
second line of (FluidAD2) as an example. Recall the definition
of the Shapley value (1). The payoff of peer n is the marginal
cost reduction v(S ∪ {n}) − v(S) that is averaged over all
equally probable arrangements, i.e., the orders of players. It is
also implied by (1) that the expectation of the marginal cost
is computed under the assumption that the events |S| = y and
|S| = y′ for y 6= y′ are equally probable, i.e., P(|S| = y) =
P(|S| = y′). Therefore, in our context of infinite player game
in Theorem 1, for every values of ux along the interval [0, x],
the subset S ⊆ Z¯ ∪ H¯ contains ux fraction of the peers. More
importantly, the probability that each provider is a member of
S is simply u because the size of peers in S, ηux, is infinite
as η → ∞ so that the size of S is not affected by whether
a provider belongs to S or not. Therefore, the marginal cost
reduction of each peer on the condition that both providers
are contained in S becomes −u2 dM
{p,q}
Ω
dx (ux). Likewise, the
marginal cost reduction of each peer on the condition that only
one provider is in the coalition is −u(1− u)dM
{p}
Ω
dx (ux).
IV. INSTABILITY OF THE GRAND COALITION
In this section, we study the stability of the grand coalition
to see if rational players are willing to form the grand
coalition, only under which they can be paid their respective
fair Shapley payoffs. The key message of this section is
that the rational behavior of the providers makes the Shapley
value approach unworkable because the major premise of the
Shapley value, the grand coalition, is not formed in the multi-
provider games.
A. Stability of the Grand Coalition
Guaranteeing the stability of a payoff vector has been
an important topic in coalition game theory. For the single-
provider case, |Z| = 1, it was shown in [4, Theorem 4.2] that,
if the cost function is decreasing and concave, the Shapley
incentive structure lies in the core of the game. What if for
|Z| ≥ 2? Is the grand coalition stable for the multi-provider
case? Prior to addressing this question, we first define the
following:
Definition 6 (Noncontributing Provider). A provider p ∈ Z
is called noncontributing if MZΩ (1)−MZ\{p}Ω (1) = Ω˜p(0).
To understand this better, note that the above expression is
equivalent to the following:∑
i∈Z
Ω˜i(0)−MZΩ (1) =
∑
i∈Z\{p}
Ω˜i(0)−M
Z\{p}
Ω (1) (6)
which implies that there is no difference in the total cost
reduction, irrespective of whether the provider p is in the
provider set or not. Interestingly, if all cost functions are
concave, there exists at least one noncontributing provider.
Lemma 2. Suppose |Z| ≥ 2. If Ω˜p(·) is concave for all p ∈
Z , there exist |Z| − 1 noncontributing providers.
To prove this, recall the definition of MZΩ (·):
MZΩ (x) = miny∈Y (x)
∑
i∈Z Ω˜i(yi)
where Y (x) := {(y1, · · · , y|Z|)
∣∣ ∑
i∈Z yi ≤ x, yi ≥ 0}.
Since the summation of concave functions is concave and the
minimum of a concave function over a convex feasible region
Y (x) is an extreme point of Y (x) as shown in [19, Theorem
3.4.7], we can see that the solutions of the above minimization
are the extreme points of {(y1, · · · , y|Z|) |
∑
i∈Z yi ≤ x, yi ≥
0}, which in turn imply yi = 0 for |Z| − 1 providers in Z .
Note that the condition |Z| ≥ 2 is necessary here.
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Fig. 4. Example 1: A-D Payoffs of Two Providers and Peers for Convex Cost Functions.
We are ready to state the following theorem, a direct
consequence of Theorem 1. Its proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Shapley Payoff Not in the Core). If there ex-
ists a noncontributing provider, the Shapley payoff for the
game (Z ∪H, v) does not lie in the core.
It follows from Lemma 2 that, if all operational cost
functions are concave and |Z| ≥ 2, the Shapley payoff does
not lie in the core. This result appears to be in good agreement
with our usual intuition. If there is a provider who does not
contribute to the coalition at all in the sense of (6) and is
still being paid due to her potential for imaginary contribution
assessed by the Shapley formula (1), which is not actually
exploited in the current coalition, other players may improve
their payoff sum by expelling the noncontributing provider.
The condition |Z| ≥ 2 plays an essential role in the theorem.
For |Z| ≥ 2, the concavity of the cost functions leads to the
Shapley value not lying in the core, whereas, for the case
|Z| = 1, the concavity of the cost function is proven to make
the Shapley incentive structure lie in the core [4, Theorem
4.2].
B. Convergence to the Grand Coalition
The notion of the core lends itself to the stability analysis
of the grand coalition on the assumption that the players are
already in the equilibrium, i.e., the grand coalition. However,
Theorem 2 still leaves further questions unanswered. In par-
ticular, for the non-concave cost functions, it is unclear if the
Shapley value is not in the core, which is still an open problem.
We rather argue here that, whether the Shapley value lies in the
core or not, the grand coalition is unlikely to occur by showing
that the grand coalition is not a global attractor under some
conditions.
To study the convergence of a game with coalition structure
to the grand coalition, let us recall Definition 3. It is interesting
that, though the notion of stability was not used in [4], one
main argument of this work was that the system with one
provider would converge to a full sharing mode, i.e., the grand
coalition, hinting the importance of the following convergence
result with multiple providers. The proof of the following
theorem is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3 (A-D Payoff Doesn’t Lead to Grand Coalition).
Suppose |Z| ≥ 2 and Ω˜p(y) is not constant in the interval
y ∈ [0, x] for any p ∈ Z where x = |H¯|/|H |. The following
holds for all p ∈ Z and n ∈ H¯ .
• The A-D payoff of provider p in coalition {p} ∪ H¯ is
larger than that in all coalition T ∪ H¯ for {p} ( T ⊆ Z .
• The A-D payoff of peer n in coalition {p}∪ H¯ is smaller
than that in all coalition T ∪ H¯ for {p} ( T ⊆ Z .
In plain words, a provider, who is in cooperation with a peer
set, will receive the highest dividend when she cooperates only
with the peers excluding other providers whereas each peer
wants to cooperate with as many as possible providers. It is
surprising that, for the multiple provider case, i.e., |Z| ≥ 2,
each provider benefits from forming a single-provider coalition
whether the cost function is concave or not. There is no
positive incentives for providers to cooperate with each other
under the implementation of A-D payoffs. On the contrary, a
peer always looses by leaving the grand coalition.
Upon the condition that each provider begins with a single-
provider coalition with a sufficiently large number of peers,
one cannot reach the grand coalition because some single-
provider coalitions are already stable in the sense of the
stability in Definition 3. That is, the grand coalition is not
the global attractor. For instance, take P = {{p}∪H, · · · } as
the current coalition structure where all peers are possessed
by provider p. Then it follows from Theorem 3 that players
cannot make any transition from P to {Φ ∪ H, · · · } where
Φ ⊆ Z is any superset of {p} because provider p will not
agree to do so.
V. CRITIQUE OF A-D PAYOFF FOR SEPARATE PROVIDERS
The discussion so far has focused on the stability of the
grand coalition. The result in Theorem 2 suggests that if there
is a noncontributing (free-riding) provider, which is true even
for concave cost functions for multiple providers, the grand
coalition will not be formed. The situation is aggravated by
Theorem 3, stating that single-provider coalitions (i.e., the
separated case) will persist if providers are rational. We now
illustrate the weak points of the A-D payoff under the single-
provider coalitions with three representative examples.
A. Unfairness and Monopoly
Example 1 (Unfairness). Suppose that there are two
providers, i.e., Z = {p, q}, with Ω˜p(x) = 7(x− 1)1.5/8+1/8
and Ω˜q(x) = 1−x, both of which are decreasing and convex.
All values are shown in Fig. 4 as functions of x. In line with
Theorem 3, provider p is paid more than her Shapley value,
whereas peers are paid less than theirs.
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Fig. 5. Example 2: A-D Payoffs of Two Providers and Peers for Concave Cost Functions.
We can see that each peer n will be paid 21/32 (ϕ˜{p}n (0))
when he is contained by the coalition {p, n} and the payoff
decreases with the number of peers in this coalition. On the
other hand, provider p wants to be assisted by as many peers
as possible because ϕ˜{p}p (x) is increasing in x. If it is possible
for n to prevent other peers from joining the coalition, he can
get 21/32. However, it is more likely in real systems that no
peer can kick out other peers, as discussed in [4, Section 5.1]
as well. Thus, p will be assisted by x = 0.6163 fraction of
peers, which is the unique solution of ϕ˜{p}n (x) = ϕ˜{q}n (x)
while q will be assisted by 1− x = 0.3837 fraction of peers.
Example 2 (Monopoly). Consider a two-provider system
Z = {p, q} with Ω˜p(x) = 1−x3/2 and Ω˜q(x) = 1−2x/3, both
of which are decreasing and concave. Similar to Example 1, we
can obtain ϕ˜{p}p (x) = 2x3/2/5, ϕ˜{q}q (x) = x/3, ϕ˜{p}n (x) =
3x1/2/5 and ϕ˜{q}n (x) = 1/3. All values including the Shapley
values are shown in Fig. 5. Not to mention unfairness in line
with Example 1 and Theorem 3, provider p monopolizes the
whole peer-assisted services. No provider has an incentive
to cooperate with other provider. It can be seen that all
peers will assist provider p because ϕ˜{p}n (x) > ϕ˜{q}n (x)
for x > 25/81. Appealing to Definition 3, if the providers
are initially separated, the coalition structure will converge
to the service monopoly by p. In line with Lemma 2 and
Theorem 2, even if the grand coalition is supposed to be the
initial condition, it is not stable in the sense of the core. The
noncontributing provider (Definition 6) in this example is q.
B. Instability of A-D Payoff Mechanism
The last example illustrates the A-D payoff can even induce
an analog of the limit cycle in nonlinear systems, i.e., a closed
trajectory having the property that other trajectories spirals into
it as time approaches infinity.
Example 3 (Oscillation). Let us consider a game with two
providers and two peers where N = {p1, p2, n1, n2}. If {n1},
{n2} and {n1, n2} assist the content distribution of p1, the
reduction of the distribution cost is respectively 10$, 9$ and
11$ per month. However, the hard disk maintenance cost
incurred from a peer is 5$. In the meantime, if {n1}, {n2} and
{n1, n2} assist the content distribution of p2, the reduction of
the distribution cost is respectively 6$, 3$ and 13$ per month.
In this case, the hard disk maintenance cost incurred from a
Fig. 6. Example 3: A-D Payoff Leads to Oscillatory Coalition Structure.
peer is supposed to be 2$ due to smaller contents of p2 as
opposed to those of p1.
For simplicity, we omit the computation of the A-D payoffs
for all coalition structures and stability analysis (see Appendix
of [20] and Table 1 in [20] for details). We first observe that
the Shapley payoff of this example does not lie in the core. As
time tends to infinity, the A-D payoff exhibits an oscillation
of the partition P consisting of the four recurrent coalition
structures as shown in Fig. 6, where, for notational simplicity,
we adopt a simplified expression for coalitional structure P :
a coalition {a, b, c} ∈ P is denoted by abc and each singleton
set {i} is denoted by i. The evolution of coalition structure is
governed by a simple rule: if there exist blocking coalitions
(See Definition 3), then arbitrary one of them will be formed.
Let us begin with the partition {p1, p2n1n2}. Player p1
could have achieved the maximum payoff if he had formed
a coalition only with n1. However, player n1 will remain in
the current coalition because he does not improve away from
the current coalition. Instead, Player n2 breaks the coalition
p2n1n2 so that n2 and p1 can form coalition p1n2 for their
benefit. As soon as the coalition p2n1n2 is broken, p1 betrays
n2 to increase his payoff by colluding with n1. It is not clear
how this behavior will be in large-scale systems, as reported
in the literature [9].
VI. A FAIR, BARGAINING, AND STABLE PAYOFF
MECHANISM FOR PEER-ASSISTED SERVICES
The key messages from the examples in Section V imply
that the A-D value of the separate case gives rise to unfairness,
monopoly, and even oscillation. Also, it turns out that some
players’ coalition worth exceeds their Shapley payoffs which
they are paid in the grand coalition (Theorem 2). Thus, the
Shapley payoff scheme does not seem to be executable in
practice because it is impossible to make all players happy,
unequivocally. That being said, the fairness of profit-sharing
9χ˜Z¯i (x) = ϕ˜
Z
i (1) +
w′i
x+
∑
j∈Z¯ wj
(∑
j∈Z¯ Ωj(0)−M
Z¯
Ω (x) −
(
xϕ˜Zn (1) +
∑
j∈Z¯ ϕ˜
Z
j (1)
))
where w′i =
{
wi, for i ∈ Z¯,
1, for i ∈ H¯,
(FluidChi)
Fig. 7. Fluid χ payoff formula for multi-provider coalitions.
and the opportunism of players are difficult to stand together.
Then, it is more reasonable to come up with a compromising
payoff mechanism that (i) forces players to apportion the
difference between the coalition worth and the sum of their
fair shares, (ii) grant providers a limited right of bargaining,
and (iii) stabilize the whole system. We will use a slightly dif-
ferent notion of payoff mechanism, called χ value, originally
proposed by Casajus [12].
A. An Axiomatic Characterization of χ Value
The χ value is characterized by a similar set of axioms
used for the A-D value. The only difference is that (i)
NP is weakened to GNP, causing a deficiency in axiomatic
characterization, which is made up by WSP:
Axiom 5 (Grand Coalition Null Player, GNP). If v(K ∪
{i}) = v(K) for all K ⊆ N , then φi(N, v, {N}) = 0.
Axiom 6 (Weighted Splitting, WSP). If P ′ is finer than P
(i.e., C′(i) ⊆ C(i), ∀i ∈ N ) and j ∈ P ′(i),
φi(N,v,P)−φi(N,v,P ′)
wi
=
φj(N,v,P)−φj(N,v,P ′)
wj
.
The cornerstone of χ value is the very observation that, as
the grand coalition P = {N} is broken into two or more
coalitions, player i now has another option to ally with other
coalitions than C(i) ∈ P and this outside option must be
assessed. To allow the assessment of the outside options, it
is inevitable to weaken NP (See Section II-C) to GNP, by
satisfying only which, a player may receive positive payoff so
far as he contributes to the worth of the grand coalition, even
though he does not to that of the current coalition, i.e., NP.
In the end, it is all about how to valuate the outside option,
the χ value’s choice of which is to stick to the Shapley value
by equally dividing the difference between the coalition worth
and the sum of Shapley values, i.e., WSP for P = {N}.
Recalling the definition ϕK(N, v) =
∑
i∈K ϕi(N, v) in
Section II-A, we present the following theorem (see [12], [21]
for the proof):
Theorem 4 (χ Value). The χ value is uniquely characterized
by CE, CS, ADD, GNP and WSP as follows:
χi(N, v,P) = ϕi +
wi∑
k∈C(i) wk
(
v(C(i))− ϕC(i)
) (7)
where ϕi is Shapley value of player i for non-partitioned game
(N, v) = (N, v, {N}).
B. Fluid χ Value for Multi-Provider Coalitions
Recall N = Z ∪ H , Z¯ ⊆ Z , H¯ ⊆ H and x = |H¯ |/η. To
compute the χ payoff for the multiple provider case, we first
establish in the following theorem5 a fluid χ value in line with
the analysis in Section III-B with the limit axioms:
Theorem 5 (χ Payoff for Multiple Providers). As η tends
to infinity, the χ payoffs of providers and peers under an
arbitrary coalition C = Z¯ ∪ H¯ converge to (FluidChi) in Fig.
7 where the Shapley payoffs ϕ˜Zi (1) are given in (FluidAD1)
in Fig. 3.
To intuitively interpret χ value, it is crucial to know the roles
of Axiom WSP and its weights wi. In our context, because
of fairness between peers, it is more reasonable to set wi = 1
for i ∈ H . It does not make sense to differentiate payoffs
between peers due to the peer-homogeneity assumption in
Section III-A. On the contrary, we will clarify in Sections
VI-C and VI-D why the weights of providers wi, i ∈ Z do
not necessarily have to be 1. The essential difference between
A-D value and χ value lies in WSP.
Interpretation of WSP: It implies that, if peer i loses, say
∆i, when the coalition structure changes, e.g., from the grand
coalition P = {N} to a finer coalition structure P ′ 6= {N},
the provider p ∈ C(i) will lose ∆i × wp. There are two
implications of this weighted splitting. First, since the payoff
of each player i is computed based on the baseline, i.e., the
Shapley value, and the surplus or deficit incurred by formation
of the coalition C′(i) are equally distributed for wp = 1,
χ value leads to a fair share of the profit. Secondly, now a
provider may bargain with peers over the dividend rate by
setting wp to any positive number. We elaborate on these two
implications in the following subsections.
C. Fairness: Surplus-Sharing
On the basis of the first implication of WSP, χ value is
fairer than A-D value in the following sense:
Definition 7 (Surplus-Sharing). A value φ of game
(N, v,P) is surplus-sharing if the following condition
holds: if the coalition worth of coalition C ∈ P is greater
than, equal to, or less than the sum of Shapley values of
players in C, i.e.,
∑
i∈C φi(N, v,P) T
∑
i∈C ϕi(N, v),
then the payoff of player i ∈ C is greater than, equal to,
or less than the Shapley value of player i, respectively, i.e.,
φi(N, v,P) T ϕi(N, v), for all i ∈ C and for all C ∈ P .
Since we proved in Theorem 3 that, for |Z| ≥ 2, the payoff
of provider p in coalition {p} ∪H exceeds her Shapley value
and that of peer n ∈ H is smaller than his, it is clear from this
definition that A-D value is not surplus-sharing for |Z| ≥ 2,
whereas χ value is surplus-sharing for any Z , e.g., see (7) and
(FluidChi). For reference, both A-D and χ values are surplus-
sharing if |Z| = 1.
The corresponding χ payoffs of Examples 1 and 2 for wi =
1, ∀i ∈ Z , are shown in Figs. 8 and 9. As was the case of
the A-D payoffs in Examples 1 and 2, the grand coalitions
are not stable. However, due to the surplus-sharing property
5In order to compute χ payoff of player i, we need to know not only the
current coalition C(i) but also Shapley values of players in C(i). However,
χ payoff still satisfies Definition 2. Therefore, we can compute the payoff of
player i in coalition C(i) irrespective of other coalitions.
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Fig. 8. Example 1: χ Payoffs of Two Providers and Peers for Convex Cost
Functions with wp = wq = 1.
Shapley Values
Shapley Value
Fig. 9. Example 2: χ Payoffs of Two Providers and Peers for Concave Cost
Functions with wp = wq = 1.
of the χ payoff, whenever the coalition worth is larger than
the Shapley sum of players in the coalition, all players in the
coalition are paid more and vice versa. For instance, we can
see from Fig. 8 that if the coalition is formed by provider q
and x > 0.5625 fraction of peers, all members of the coalition
are paid more than their respective Shapley payoffs.
As shown in Fig. 9, the monopoly phenomenon of Example
2 for the case of A-D payoff is still observed for the case of
χ value. Regarding Example 1, as shown in Fig. 8, χ payoff
even induces the monopoly by q, which did not exist for the
case of A-D payoff.
D. Bargaining over the Dividend Rate
Another implication of WSP is that a provider bargains with
peers over the division of the profit and loss by setting wi to
a nonnegative real value. For instance, consider the case when
the coalition worth exceeds the Shapley sum of players in the
coalition, e.g., v(C(p)) > ϕC(p) in (7), where p ∈ Z is the
only provider in coalition C(p). In this case, a provider may
award an extra bonus to peers by setting wp < 1, or make
more profit by setting wp > 1. For the coalition worth smaller
than the sum of Shapley payoffs, a provider may compensate
peers for loss by using wp > 1. Setting wp = 1 guarantees
the fair profit-sharing between provider p and peers, whereas
provider p may be willing to use wp 6= 1 for bargaining.
Although wp can be viewed as a flexible knob to balance the
fairness of the system and the bargaining powers of providers,
regulators need to control the providers by introducing upper
and lower bounds on wp which may depend on whether
v(C(p)) > ϕC(p) or not, because wp have opposite meanings
for the two cases. For example, providers may use weights
Shapley Values
Payoff of is maximized at =0.6994p x
Shapley Value
Payoff of peers with is maximized at =0.6994p x
Fig. 10. Example 1: χ Payoffs of Two Providers and Peers for Convex Cost
Functions with wp = 0.1 and wq = 3.
satisfying the following condition:{
wp ≥ wp, if v(C(p)) < ϕC(p),
0 ≤ wp ≤ wp, if v(C(p)) ≥ ϕC(p).
Two bounds, wp and wp can be viewed as a preventive
measure taken by the authorities to avoid unfair rivalries
between providers.
Adopting non-identical weights wp = 0.1 and wq = 3, we
revisit Example 1. Unlike Fig. 8 where provider q monopolizes
all peers because χ˜{q}q (1) and χ˜{q}i (1) for i ∈ H is the
biggest possible payoffs for q and any peers, the monopoly
for this set of weights is broken as shown in Fig. 10. Now
providers p and q will possess 0.6994 and 0.3006 fraction of
peers, respectively. It is remarkable that the χ payoffs are still
surplus-sharing as in Figs. 8 and 9.
E. Stability of Coalition Structures
The χ value of the game in Example 3 with equal weights
wi = 1, for all i ∈ N , is shown in Table I. As discussed in
[12], NP is not suitable for a value reflecting outside options.
For example, let us consider the partition {p1p2, n1, n2}. For
the case of the A-D value, payoffs of both providers p1 and
p2 are 0. However, as we observe from Example 3, the best
p1 can do is to ally with n1 to reduce her operational cost by
v({p1, n1}) = 5 whereas the best p2 can do to reduce hers by
v({p2, n1, n2}) = 9. In other words, p1 should release p2 so
that p2 can create her worth because p2 has a worthier outside
option, to reflect which, χ value implementation “punishes” p1
by giving her a negative payoff χp1 = −1.
We also observe from Table I that players who can be better
off by leaving the current coalition are paid more than others.
For example, consider the partition {p1n2, p2, n1}. For the
case of A-D payoffs, p1 and n2 received the same payoff 2
(See Table 1 in [20]). However, in Table I, n2 is paid more
than p1 because n2 has the potential for creating the worthiest
coalition p1p2n1n2 or p2n1n2, i.e., v(·) = 9. Though n2 will
not be able to break the partition {p1n2, p2, n1} according
to the stability defined in Definition 3, n2 is paid more than
p1 essentially for its assessed potential. In this case, the final
form of coalition structure after its endogenous evolution is
the state {p1n2, p2n1}. There are now two absorbing states
{p1n1, p2, n2} and {p1n2, p2n1}, as shown in Table I, which
are stable in the sense of Definition 3. On the contrary, there
does not exist any stable state for the case of A-D payoff as
shown in Fig. 6 (See also Section V-B and Table 1 in [20]).
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TABLE I
EXAMPLE 3: χ PAYOFF AND BLOCKING COALITION C
{p1p2, n1n2} {p1p2, n1, n2} {p1n1, p2, n2} {p1, p2, n1, n2} {p1n1, p2n2}
χp1 -1 -1 5/3=1.67 0 5/3=1.67
χp2 1 1 0 0 7/6=1.17
χn1 1/2=0.5 0 10/3=3.33 0 10/3=3.33
χn2 -1/2=-0.5 0 0 0 -1/6=-0.17
C
p1,n2,p1n1,p2n2,p1n2,p2n1 p1,p1n1,p1n2,p2n1 p1n1,p1n2,p2n1
p1p2n1n2,p1p2n1,p1p2n2 p1p2n1n2,p1p2n1,p1p2n2 − p1p2n1n2,p1p2n1,p1p2n2 n2
p1n1n2,p2n1n2,p1p2n1n2 p1n1n2,p2n1n2,p1p2n1n2 p2n1n2,p1p2n1n2
{p1p2n2, n1} {p1p2n1, n2} {p2n1n2, p1} {p1p2n1n2} {p1n2, p2, n1}
χp1 4/9=0.44 4/9=0.44 0 7/6 = 1.17 5/3=1.67
χp2 22/9=2.44 22/9=2.44 32/9=3.56 19/6 = 3.17 0
χn1 0 19/9=2.11 29/9=3.22 17/6 = 2.83 0
χn2 10/9=1.11 0 20/9=2.22 11/6 = 1.83 7/3=2.33
C p1n1,p1p2n1n2,p2n1n2,p1n2 p1n1,p2n1n2,p1n2 p1n2, p1n1 p1n1,p2n1n2,p1n2 p2n1
{p1n1n2, p2} {p1, p2, n1n2} {p1, n1, p2n2} {p1, n2, p2n1} {p1n2, p2n1}
χp1 -4/9=-0.44 0 0 0 5/3=1.67
χp2 0 0 7/6=1.17 13/6=2.17 13/6=2.17
χn1 11/9=1.22 1/2=0.5 0 11/6=1.83 11/6=1.83
χn2 2/9=0.22 -1/2=-0.5 -1/6=-0.17 0 7/3=2.33
C
p1,p1n1,p1n2,p2n1, n2,p1n1,p2n2,p1n2,p2n1 p1n1,p1n2,p2n1, p1n1,p1n2,
p2n1n2,p1p2n1n2 p1p2n1n2,p1p2n1,p1p2n2 p1p2n1n2,p1p2n1 p1p2n1n2,p1p2n2 −
p1p2n1,p1p2n2 p2n1n2,p1p2n1n2 p2n1n2,p1p2n2,n2 p2n1n2,p1p2n1
A more general result [12, Theorem 6.1] is that, if we adopt
χ value to distribute the profit of the peer-assisted services,
the system always has at least one stable coalition structure,
irrespective of the number of providers. It it also remarkable
that the following theorem holds without any restriction on
operational cost Ω˜p(·), whereas we assumed that Ω˜p(·) is non-
increasing in Section III.
Theorem 6 (Stability of χ Payoff). For χ value, there al-
ways exists a stable coalition structure P .
Also, it follows from [12, Corollary 6.4] that the instability
of the grand coalition cannot be improved:
Corollary 3 (Stability of Grand Coalition Preserved).
The grand coalition of χ value is stable if and only if the
Shapley value lies in the core.
To summarize, even if we adopt χ value, the instability of
the grand coalition for the Shapley payoff which we observed
in Theorem 2 remains unchanged. However, it is guaranteed
that there exists a stable coalition structure for χ value.
VII. APPLICATION TO DELAY-TOLERANT NETWORKS
In this section, we present a concrete example of the peer-
assisted services in delay-tolerant networks where mobile
users share certain contents with each other in a peer-to-peer
fashion [22]: whenever two mobile users meet, a user whose
content is more recent pushes it to the other whose content
is outdated. We consider here a single class case, using the
method in [22].
We assume that there exist two providers, p and q, whose
contents differ. Users who are subscribing to the content of a
provider are assumed to assist the provider in any case. The
fraction of users subscribing to each provider is denoted by
x0p and x0q . As discussed in Section III-A, we also assume
that a non-subscribing user is allowed to assist at most one
provider. Suppose that the content providers p and q push
content updates to users, who are assisting providers, with the
rate µp and µq , respectively, and every user meets other users
with the aggregate rate λ. Then it follows from the analysis in
Fig. 11. Cost Functions of Two Providers in the Delay-Tolerant Network.
[22, Section 5.1] that, if xp ≥ x0p fraction of users are assisting
provider p, for a user who is subscribing to provider p, the
expected age of the content and the outage probability that the
age is larger than Gmaxp are:
G¯p =
1
xpλ
ln
xpλ+ µp
µp
, PCp =
xpλ+ µp
xpλ+ µpe
(µp+xpλ)Gmaxp
.
The above two expressions can be easily derived by using
integration by parts. A provider may guarantee subscribers a
certain level of quality of service by imposing constraints such
as (i) G¯p ≤ 1min or (ii) PCp ≤ 0.01 for Gmaxp = 10min, of
which we use the former here.
For instance, the cost function of provider p can be com-
puted by solving the following optimization problem over µp:
minµp xpµp subject to : G¯p ≤ gp
where xpµp corresponds to the average cost per user. The
solution of this problem yields provider p’s cost function:
Ω˜p(x) := xµ
∗
p =
x2λ
exp (xλgp)− 1
where we dropped the subscript p from xp. Suppose x0p =
0.4 and x0q = 0.3. If providers p and q use gp = 5/λ and
gq = 10/λ, i.e., provider p has decided to maintain a lower
average age of the content than that of provider q, we get
the cost functions Ω˜p(x+ x0p)/λ and Ω˜q(x+ x0q)/λ as shown
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in Fig. 11. By computing the equations in (FluidAD2) and
(FluidChi), it is not difficult to see that provider p monopolizes
the remaining fraction of users, 1 − x0p − x0q = 0.3, whether
we adopt the A-D payoff or χ payoff. Nonetheless, users can
receive more under the χ payoff than under the A-D payoff
due to the surplus-sharing property discussed in Section VI-C.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
A quote from an interview of BBC iPlayer with CNET UK
[23]: “Some people didn’t like their upload bandwidth being
used. It was clearly a concern for us, and we want to make
sure that everyone is happy, unequivocally, using iPlayer.”
In this paper, we have first studied the incentive structure
in peer-assisted services with multiple providers, where the
popular Shapley value based scheme might be in conflict
with the pursuit of profits by rational content providers and
peers. The key messages from our analysis are summarized
as: First, even though it is fair to pay peers more because
they become relatively more useful as the number of peer-
assisted services increases, the content providers will not admit
that peers should receive their fair shares. The providers tend
to persist in single-provider coalitions. In the sense of the
classical stability notion, called ‘core’, the cooperation would
have been broken even if we had begun with the grand coali-
tion as the initial condition. Second, we have illustrated yet
another problems when we use the Shapley-like incentive for
the exclusive single-provider coalitions. These results suggest
that the profit-sharing system, Shapley value, and hence its
fairness axioms, are not compatible with the selfishness of
the content providers. We have proposed an alternate, realistic
incentive structure in peer-assisted services, called χ value,
which reflects a trade-off between fairness and rationality of
individuals. Moreover, the weights of χ value can serve as a
flexible knob to enable providers to bargain with peers over the
dividend rate at the same time as a preventive measure to avoid
cutthroat or unfair competition between providers. However,
we recognize the limitation of these results, which are based
on the assumption that there is no additional cost reduction
other than that achieved from the peer-partition optimization.
We surmise that providers in cooperation can make further
expenses cut by pooling and optimizing their resources, and
traffic engineering, which will transform their cost functions.
The question remains open how the ramifications of this type
of cooperation can be quantified in peer-assisted services.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that we use notation ϕ˜Z¯(x) to denote ϕ˜(Z¯ ∪ H¯, v).
We use the mathematical induction to prove this theorem. The
equation (FluidAD1) holds for |Z¯| = 0 and Z¯ = ∅ (empty set)
because we have from (FluidAD1) that there is no provider to
pay and ϕ˜∅n(x) = 0 for n ∈ H¯.
Now we assume that (FluidAD1) holds for all Ξ ( Z¯ such
that |Ξ| ≤ ξ where ξ ≥ 0. To prove Theorem 1, it suffices
to show that (FluidAD1) also holds for all Ξ′ ⊆ Z¯ such that
|Ξ′| = ξ + 1. To this end, we first apply Axiom CE. As η
tends to infinity while x remains unchanged, for p ∈ Ξ′ and
n ∈ H¯ , Axiom CE for the partition {Ξ′∪ H¯} can be rewritten
as follows:∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x) + xϕ˜
Ξ′
n (x) =
∑
p∈Ξ′ Ω˜p(0)−M
Ξ′
Ω (x) (8)
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which is the normalized (which we did in (4)) total coalition
worth created by the coalition Ξ′∪H¯ . Another axiom we apply
is Axiom FAIR (fairness) which was used by Myerson [24]
to characterize the Shapley value. It follows from FAIR that
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x)− ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x) =
d
dx ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x), for all p ∈ Ξ′. (9)
Summing up (9) for all p ∈ Ξ′ and dividing the sum by |Ξ′| =
ξ + 1, we obtain
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x) =
1
ξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′
(
ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x) +
d
dx ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x)
)
= 1ξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x) +
1
ξ+1
d
dx
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x).
(10)
Plugging (10) into (8), we obtain
(ξ + 1)
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x) + x
d
dx
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x)
=(ξ + 1)
(∑
p∈Ξ′ Ω˜p(0)−M
Ξ′
Ω (x)
)
− x
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x).
(11)
Since we know the form of ϕ˜Ξ
′\{p}
n (x) for all p ∈ Ξ′ from the
assumption (∵ |Ξ′ \ {p}| = ξ), (11) is an ordinary differential
equation of the function
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x). Denote the RHS of
(11) by G(x). Appealing to [4, Lemma 3], we get∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x) =
∫ 1
0
uξG(ux)du
=
∑
p∈Ξ′ Ω˜p(0)−
∫ 1
0
uξ(ξ + 1)MΞ
′
Ω (ux)du
−
∫ 1
0
uξ+1x
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du,
d
dx
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′
p (x) = −(ξ + 1)
∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1 dM
Ξ′
Ω
dx (ux)du
−
∫ 1
0
uξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du
−
∫ 1
0
uξ+2x
∑
p∈Ξ′
dϕ˜Ξ
′\{p}
n
dx (ux)du (12)
= −(ξ + 1)
∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1 dM
Ξ′
Ω
dx (ux)du
+ (ξ + 1)
∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du−
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n .
(13)
where the last expression follows by integrating the last term
of (12) by parts. From (10) and (13), ϕ˜Ξ′n (x) is rearranged as
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x) = −
∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1 dM
Ξ′
Ω
dx (ux)du
+
∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du. (14)
From the assumption, ϕ˜Ξ
′\{p}
n (x) is given by (FluidAD1) for
Z¯ = Ξ′ \ {p}, which is plugged into the last term of (14) to
yield∫ 1
0 u
ξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du
=−
∑
p∈Ξ′
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(ut)|S|(u− ut)ξ−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (utx)udtdu.
(15)
To reduce the double integral of (15), we use the following
fact: ∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(ut)|S|(u− ut)ξ−|S|f(utx)udtdu
=
∫ 1
0
∫ u
0
τ |S|(u− τ)ξ−|S|f(τx)dτdu
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
τ τ
|S|(u− τ)ξ−|S|f(τx)dudτ
=
∫ 1
0
1
ξ+1−|S|τ
|S|(1− τ)ξ+1−|S|f(τx)dτ (16)
where we used the change of variable ut = τ and changed
the order of the double integration with respect to u and τ .
Plugging (16) into (15) yields∫ 1
0
uξ+1
∑
p∈Ξ′ ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (ux)du
= −
∑
p∈Ξ′
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
1
ξ+1−|S|
∫ 1
0 u
|S|(1−u)ξ+1−|S|
dMSΩ
dx (ux)du
= −
∑
S⊆Ξ′,S 6=Ξ′
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)ξ+1−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (ux)du. (17)
where the last equality holds because∑
p∈Ξ′
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p} f(S) :
∑
S⊆Ξ′,S 6=Ξ′ f(S)
= (ξ + 1) ·
(
ξ
|S|
)
:
(
ξ+1
|S|
)
= ξ + 1− |S| : 1.
Plugging (17) into (14) establishes the following desired result:
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x) = −
∑
S⊆Ξ′
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1 − u)ξ+1−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (ux)du (18)
from which it follows
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x)− ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x) =
−
∑
S⊆Ξ′
∫ 1
0 u
|S|(1− u)ξ+1−|S|
dMSΩ
dx (ux)du
+
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)ξ−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (ux)du.
The first term of the RHS can be decomposed into the
following:
−
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|+1(1− u)ξ+1−(|S|+1)
dM
S∪{p}
Ω
dx (ux)du
−
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)ξ+1−|S| dM
S
Ω
dx (ux)du.
Thus, we can obtain
ϕ˜Ξ
′
n (x)− ϕ˜
Ξ′\{p}
n (x) =
−
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|+1(1−u)ξ−|S|
(
dM
S∪{p}
Ω
dx (ux)−
dMSΩ
dx (ux)
)
du.
(19)
Integrating (9) with respect to x and from (19), we get
ϕ˜Ξ
′
p (x) =
−
∑
S⊆Ξ′\{p}
∫ 1
0 u
|S|(1−u)ξ−|S|
[
M
S∪{p}
Ω (y)−M
S
Ω(y)
]y=ux
y=0
du.
Because MS∪{p}Ω (0) −M
S
Ω(0) = Ω˜p(0), the above equation
combined with (18) finally establishes that (FluidAD1) also
holds for all Ξ′ ⊆ Z¯ where |Ξ′| = ξ + 1, hence completing
the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem, we need to show that the condition
for the core in Definition 1 is violated, implying that it suffices
to show the following:
ϕ˜Zp (1) >
∑
i∈Z
Ω˜i(0)−MZΩ (1)−
 ∑
i∈Z\{p}
Ω˜i(0)−M
Z\{p}
Ω (1)

= Ω˜p(0)−
(
MZΩ (1)−M
Z\{p}
Ω (1)
)
. (20)
This means that the payoff of p ∈ Z is greater than the
marginal increase of the limit worth, i.e.,
limη→∞
1
ηv(Z ∪H)− limη→∞
1
ηv((Z \ {p}) ∪H).
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Subtracting the RHS of (20) from the LHS of (20) and using
the expression of ϕ˜Zp (1) in (FluidAD1), we have
MZΩ (1)−M
Z\{p}
Ω (1)
−
∑
S⊆Z\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)|Z|−1−|S|
(
M
S∪{p}
Ω (u)−M
S
Ω(u)
)
du.
(21)
We see from Definition 6 that MZΩ (1)−M
Z\{p}
Ω (1) = Ω˜p(0).
From the assumption, there exists a noncontributing provider
which we denote by p. To show that (21) is strictly positive,
we rewrite the last factor of the integrand as follows:
M
S∪{p}
Ω (y)−M
S
Ω(y) =
min
{∑
i∈S∪{p} Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S∪{p} yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
−min
{∑
i∈S Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
where the first term in the RHS can be rearranged as
min
{∑
i∈S∪{p} Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S∪{p} yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
≤ Ω˜p(0) + min
{∑
i∈S Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
where the inequality holds from that Ω˜i(y), i ∈ Z , are non-
increasing. It can be easily seen that the inequality holds by
considering two cases yp = 0 and yp > 0. The inequality
becomes strict when S = ∅ over some interval in [0, x] whose
length is positive due to the assumption that Ω˜p(y) is not
constant in the interval y ∈ [0, x] and non-increasing. From
this, we see that (21) is greater than
Ω˜p(0)−
∑
S⊆Z\{p}
∫ 1
0
u|S|(1− u)|Z|−1−|S|Ω˜p(0)du = 0
which establishes (20), hence completing the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, it suffices to show that the following
is positive for {p} ( T such that T ⊆ Z:
ϕ
{p}
p (x)− ϕTp (x) = −
∫ 1
0
M
{p}
Ω (ux)du∑
S⊆T\{p}
∫ 1
0 u
|S|(1 − u)|T |−1−|S|
(
M
S∪{p}
Ω (ux)−M
S
Ω(ux)
)
du
(22)
which implies that the payoff of p when it is the only provider
of the coalition is larger than that with other providers T \{p}.
To this end, we first observe that, for y ≤ x,
M
S∪{p}
Ω (y)−M
S
Ω(y) =
min
{∑
i∈S∪{p} Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S∪{p} yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
−min
{∑
i∈S Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
.
Here the first term in the RHS can be rearranged as
min
{∑
i∈S∪{p} Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S∪{p} yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
≥M
{p}
Ω (y) + min
{∑
i∈S Ω˜i(yi)
∣∣ ∑
i∈S yi ≤ y, yi ≥ 0
}
where the inequality holds from that M{i}Ω (y), i ∈ T , are non-
increasing. It can be easily seen that the inequality holds by
considering two cases yp = 0 and yp > 0. The inequality
becomes strict when S = ∅ over some interval in [0, x] whose
length is positive due to the assumption that Ω˜p(y) is not
constant in the interval y ∈ [0, x] and non-increasing. From
this inequality, we have MS∪{p}Ω (y)−MSΩ(y) ≥M
{p}
Ω (y) and
the inequality is strict over some interval of positive length.
Plugging this relation into (22) yields ϕ{p}p (x) − ϕTp (x) > 0.
Note that from (8), we have:
limη→∞ v({p} ∪ H¯)/η = Ω˜p(0)−M
{p}
Ω (x)
≤
∑
i∈T Ω˜i(0)−M
T
Ω (x) = limη→∞ v(T ∪ H¯)/η
which, when combined with ϕ{p}p (x) > ϕTp (x), implies the
second part of the theorem.
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